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This paper develops a framework to investigate the optimal timing of
standardization in which the tradeoff between standardization and experiment is explicitly
analyzed. Erwrte standardization ensures early benefits of compatibility while the
standard chosen could be a "wrong" one since the decision is made without precise
information about the actual values of potential technologies. Ex post standardization
relies on the market mechanism to achieve defucto standardization after experimentation.
The advantage of this approach is that the standardization decision can be based on better
information about qualuies. The cost is the transient loss of compatibility benefit in the
experimentation stage. The market outcome is shown to generate too little expost
standardization after experimentation compared with the social optimum. Consequently,
users adopt ex arue standardization too frequently compared with the social optimum. The
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1. Introduction
In many high .tech industries, such as telecommunications and the computer,
compatibility plays an increasingly critical role in harnessing potential demand-side scale
economies, now known as network externalities. Standardization is one obvious way of
achieving compatibility. By choosing the same interface or sharing the same technical
specifications in key components, products from different manufacturers can be combined
and used in a harmonious way to exploit network externalities. ~ Standardization, however,
is not without its costs, espetially if the standards are set in the early stages of the
technological cycle, when the values of competing standards are not fully known. Since
new information about qualities can be available only over time, we cannot claim that early
standardization is better than late unless the same standard is set. Moreover, nascent
technologies often have the property that information on their true values is hard to assess
without actually using it ~Rosenberg (1982)~; only afrer tinkering and experimenting wi[h
them, will the potentials or hazards of the technologies be revealed and can aclear picture
of the optimal standard be projected. As a consequence, there is an inevitable tradeoff
between standardization and experimentation. Early standardization implies ill informed
decision making on standards, while delayed standardization after experimentation involves
at least transient losses from incompatibility between the technologies that are experimented
with.
This paper develops a framework to investigate the optimal timing of
standardization in which the tradeoff between standardization and experiment is explicitly
analyzed. 1 consider two possible approaches to achieving standardization in a two-period
~ As emphasized by Gabel (1991), standardization is not the only way ofcreating compatibílity. An alternative way to achieve compatibility, which has not been fully developed in the literature, is through the development ofconverters that allow consumers of one nehvork to utilize the network benefits ofanother. We ignore the possible availability of converters in this paper. For recent treatments ofconverters in technology adoption, see Farrell and Saloner (1992) in a static context and Choi (1993a) in a dynamic setting. David and Bunn (1988) provide an interesting case study ofconverters, which they call gateway technologies, for electric supply systems.z
model. In the first, which I call exante standardization, potentia] usersagree on selecting
the same technology without knowing the exact values of alternative technologies. 71ie
advantage of this apprnach is that they can have the full benefit ofcompatibility from the
beginning. However, their choice, based as it is on limited discriminating power, could
easily be an inferior one. The other approach is to rely on the market mechanism to achieve
de facto standardization after experimentation, which 1 call expost standardization. The
advantage of this approach is that the standardization decision can be based on better
information. The process ofex p~st standardization, however, can fail and
incompatibility between the experimented technologies can persist The reason is that in the
process ofexperimentation each firm's preferences start to diverge. Fach firm can
accumulate technology-specific complementary goods and acquire specific knowledge on
and experience with the technology it has used (experimented on).
The examples of Integrated Services Digital Networks (ISDNs) and Local Area
Networks(LANs) illustrate two distinct approaches to standardization. Since its inception,
the ISDN standards have been characterized by the network planning approach, always
addressing issues of interconnection and interoperability. The activities involved all
participants of the industry for the purpose of specifying aconsentient set of interfaces that
could serve as the comerstone ofa new network service. In contrast, LANs started as
different vendors offered incompatible versions ofthe product As a result, an open
interconnection across user groups has been difficult. However, LAN standards are now
being developed and established as more information is revealed regarding the merits of
each technology ~see Lifchus (1986) for more details).
I compare private incentives to choose one of the two approaches with thoseof a
social planner. It is shown that there aze social inefficiencies associated with the expost
standardizztion process; there is too little ex post standardization compared with the social
optimum due to the positive externality that is not accounted for in the decision making of
an individuaL [n contrast, I do not expect that ex ante standardization suffers the same3
problems since participants have not built up any vested interests and have the same
preferences? As a result, potential users will adopt the option ofex ante standardilation
over experimentation too frequently compared with the social optimum ifthe participants
foresee the inefficiency ofex post standardization accompanying experimentation? Our
analysis demonstrates the need for a new taxonomy of the standardization processes.
In this paper, I envision a situation in which no particip~ants have any competitive
advantage in any particular technology by the time a standard-setting committee is convened
to decide which type ofapproach to take for the standardization problem: ex ante or expost
standardization. Since homogeneous preferences and symmetric information are assumed
across participants, there is no conflict among participants. I expect a consensus to be
reached without any delay. My paper, therefore, differs from Farrell and Saloner (1988)
ín the initial conditions for the formal negotiation process analyzed and, as a result, in its
focus. ~hey consider a situation in which participants already have vested interests in
incompatible positions by the time formal negotiation takes place through a committee.
Their focus is on comparing the performance ofthe committee with that of the market in
arriving at a standard and resolving the conflict4 [n contrast, [ allow participants to
communicate before they take up any particular positions on possible standards.s
zln my model, vested interests in the ex pist standardization process is captured by the
"switching costs" à la Klemperer (1985, 1987). If there are no switching costs to be borne
by individual users, we will have efficiency as in Farrell and Saloners(1985) adoption
model with complete information. In addition to the existence of network externalities, my
model is also different from Klemperers in that there is uncertainty about the qualities of
products.
3[n this regard, the conclusion of my paper contrasts sharply with that of Lifchus (1986)
who advocates an ex anle standardizahon process over expenmentation based on the case
studies of ISUNs and LANs. Our analysis clearly shows the danger of an ex pi.ct
judgement for the sWndardizalion prucess when uncxrlainty is involved in the yualities of
the potential technologies.
4They also analyze the performance of a hybrid system in which coordination failure in the
committee is followed by potentially unilateral movement by participants. It is shown that
the hybrid system performs best as a coordination mechanism.
SNote that in this paper we rely only on unilateral market forces for ex post standardization
once the option ofexperimentauon is chosen by participants. However, this is a stronger
assumption than we really need; all the analysis requires is that there should be divergence4
T'here are two ways to interpret our model. First, my model is appropriate for
situations where the potential technologies to choose from are in the public domain. 1~ten,
it is not unreasonable that the technologies are approximately neutral in terms of strategic
competition. 7iie type of research performed at universities or in government-funded
projects, the outcome of which is publicly available, would fall in this category. However,
we can also apply the analysis to situadons in which proprietary technologies are developed
by private firms. In this case, standardization can be interpreted as a joint effort to develop
a new technology that is equally accessible to all participants, which ensures
standardization once the technology has been developed.b Cxperimentation, in contrast,
translates into an individual and proprietary development ofthe technology. Independent
developments without communication usually mean distinctive apptoaches to the problem
and genentes the benefit of "sampling effect" in innovation. Final outcomes of
independent developments will, however, tend to be incompatible with each other~ In this
respect, we can reinterpret the model as an analysis of the tradeoffbetween standardiration
and innovation.
Other types of potential costs associated with standardization have also been
recognized in the literature. The most prominent is the tension between standardization
and variety. Farrell and Saloner (1986), for instance, analyze the tradeoffin a model of
two types ofconsumers whose preferences differ in their ideal specifications of the good.
"Iite cost of standardization is a constraint on product variety: it is necessary for one type of
betwcen the social and private incentives. We can easily embed the analysis of Farrell and
Saloner (1988) in our model for expost standardization. Our paper and Farrell and
Saloner's should, therefore, be viewed as complementary in that they focus on different
aspects ofcommittees. Their focus is more on the role of standard-setting committees in
their conflict resolving ability, while my paper emphasiz~ their role as a simple
coordination mechanism like a"correlated' device.
6CD (compact disk) technology is the result of such an effort between Sony and Philips.
~CC (compact cassette) technology is such an example. Philips has developed the DCC
(digital compact cassette) technology while Sony has developed Mll (mini disc). 'litey are
incompatible with each other.5
consumers to consume the less ideal version ofthe good to attain a larger network benefit.8
They demonstrate that there can be too much or too little variety as in the literature on
monopolistic competition ~see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence(1976) J. In a recent
paper, Farrell and Saloner (1992) extend the analysis to a continuum ofconsumer types
and investigate the implications ofconverters for the tradeoff between wmpatibility and
variety.
Technical progress may be another casualty of standardization since it may
constrain the freedom to design and introduce optimal products.9 As argued earlier, our
model can be easily reinterpreted as an analysis ofthis tradeoff. In the context of
intemational competition, Jensen and Thursby (1992) provide a dynamic model in which
two firms compete over time over a discovery of a new standard They examine the impact
of standards set hcfore products are successfully developed. In particular, they point out
that simple standards are time-inconsistent because consumers are hurt when products ruled
out by a simple standard are discovered before the discovery ofthe product set as the
standard.~o Their main interest lies in analyzing the impact ofanticipatory product
standards on the strategic position offirms in an international patent race.
ln an earlier paper jChoi (1994b)J,1 consider the technology adoption process in
which scyuential arrival of userscreates intergenerational heterogeneity in the preferences.
Differences in the assumptions on the nature oftechnological uncertainty allow the waiting
option to be explicitly analyzed. One of the results is that consumers who arrive early
gIn the "mix-and-match" model of Matutes and Regibeau (1988), the interface compatibility
and variety go hand in hand. Compatibility between complementary components of
"systems" aids consumers in constructing their ideal system by mixmg and matching
indrvidual components purchased separately. The consequence of (mtxed) bundling m the
framework of the "mix-and-ma[ch" model is discussed by Matutes and Regibeau (1992).
9See Lifchus (1986) for a different viewpoint on this issue. He argues that standardization
stimulates innovation by forcing firms competitive decisions to "be based on factors such
as price, functionalily and performance rather than specific design and availability
considerations."
toA simple standard is defined as one that is not state-contingent. Jensen and Thursby
(1992) further show that the only type of standard which can unambiguously increase
welfare is one that is state-contmgenl.adopt one of the available technologies too soon. While the option of waiting does not
provide any new information on untested technologies in the current paper, the value of
each technology, which evolves over time, is revealed at the beginning ofeach period
regardless of its adoption history. In this sense, information is free and waiting can be a
valuable option. However, in that paper, experimenting and changing the allegiance to
technologies is not possible since technology adoption is assumed to be irreversible. In
contrast, Choi (1994a) and Waldman (1993) both consider the case where an investment
or adoption decision is not irreversible and consumers ane allowed to make repeat
purchases as in this paper. Their interests, however, are in the monopolistic supplier's
incentive to make products incompatible to induce repeat purchases on the basis ofnetwork
externalities, which they call planned obsolescence.
The paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2,1 outline the formal
model. 1 first identify the inefficiencies in the second period when the option of
experimentation is chosen in the first period. Typically, there will be too little expost
standardiTation via de facto standazds. Since these inefficiencies will be foreseen in the
first period, 1 derive the result that there will be [oo much ex ante standardization compared
with the first-best. 1 also perform some comparative statics on the relative merits of
experimentation vis-à-vis (ex ante) standardization. Section 3 considers special two point
distributions to generate a closed form solution. I demonstrate that experimentation is
more attractive as the correlation in the values of the two technologies decreases.
Concluding remazks follow, in which possible eztensions ofthe present model aze
discussed.
2. 1'hc Modcl
In this section, ( present a simple model ofstandardization problems facing
potential users of technologies exhibiting network externalities. 7itere are two time
periods, t-1, 2. Tiiere are also two potential users, 1 and 2 who can choose between twocompeting and incompatible technologies, A and B. i denote by 0 the value each user
attaches to the network extemalities conferred when the other user adopts the same
technology. The stand-alone values of these two technologies, however, are unknown to
ihe potential users. They will be revealed only after the corresponding technologies have
been used. This assumption captures the idea that the potential values of many
technologies can be ascertained only after they have been put to actual use. In the course of
being used, new ways of utilizing the technology can be found andlor new obstacles can
appear ~see Rosenberg (1982) ~.
Let a and ~ denote the values of technologies A and B, respectively. They are
nonnegative real numbers and are assumed to be drawn from ajoínt probability distribution
G(a,~). In order to expedite the presentation, l also assume that the joint distribution
function G(.,.) is symmetric in its arguments. Therefore, before the technologies are used
and their real values are revealed, they are consideredequally attractive. Finally, the
values of the technologies aze assumed to be constant across two periods. ~~ The discount
factor is denoted by b.
In the second period, the qualities ofall technologies used in the previous period
become public information. In light of new information available in the second period,
each user has the option ofadhering to the technology he used in the first period or
changing his allegiance to the other technology. 1 assume that switching to the other
technology entails a switching cost of s because theadoption oftechnology is often
accompanied by technology-specific learning and lor investment in complementary
products ~Cowan (1990), Church and Gandal (1992)~.t2
For simplicity, we make the following assumption: Let h(~~a) be the conditional
density function for ~ given the value of a. Then,
~~Choi (1994b), in contrast, analyzes the case where the values of technologies evolves
over time.
~ ZSee Klemperer (1985, 1987) for other types of switching costs and the"v implications for
market conduct and performance.8
a~1
~ h(~~a)d~ - s, for all a (1)
When both users adopt the same technology A in the first period, the true value of
technology B is still unknown in the second period. Conceivably, in the second period
they can change their standard if the value of technology A tums out to have too low a
value compared with the expected value oftechnology B. The assumption, however, says
that neither will have incentive to switch to technology B in the second period since the
conditional expected value of technology B dces not justify the switching cost. Due to the
symmetry of distribution function G(.,.), the same parallel argument can be made when
both users adopt technology B in the first period. Taken together, the assumpdon
guarantees that there will be no change in the standard in the second period if both users
adopt the same technology in the first period.t3
The game proceeds in the following way. Potential users convene before the game
to discuss how to standardize between the two competing and incompatible technologies, A
and B. 1 assume that the users have the same preferences toward the technologies.
1 considertwo possible ways of achieving compatibilities by standardization. The
first is what I call ex ante standardization, in which the two usersagret to choose the same
technology in period 1 without knowing the exact values of each technology. Since they
have no vested interests in any particular technology and share the same preferences, there
will be no coordination problem: cheap talk is sufficient to ensure consensus.t4
However, they need not set a standard in the first period. They may agree not to
standardize, thereby opting for each party to experiment with different technologies.
When the values of these two technologies are known after the fust period, they can hope
for de.`ucro standardization to occur ex post. The tradeoff between these two approaches
~~This assumption is not crucial to the main results of the paper and can be easilY
dispensed with.
~4We ignore the possibility of "babbling equilibria" in which everybody talks nonsense
and refuses to listen.9
is clear. Ex ante standardi~ation ensures the benefit of compatibility from the beginning of
the technological cycle. However, the standard is set with limited information.
Experimentation with different technologies allows them to settle for a standard with better
information. "1'he cost of experirnentation is the ini[ial loss of comp~atibility benefit. On top
of it, there is no guarantee that a de facto standard will be set even after what the full
potential of each technology is known and which technology is the best. The reason is that
in the process of experimentation, each user starts to acquire vested interests in the
technology he has experimented with. As a consequenceof this conflict, the initial
incompatibilities may persist. This captures the idea that delayed standardization is difficult
~Farrell and Saloner (1987) ~.
2.l. E.rpc~rimcntution
To analyze the expected value ofeach option, the second period problem should be
addressed first. Suppose that the potential users decide to experiment with different
technologies. Without loss of generality I assume that user 1 chooses technology A and
user B chooses technology B in the first period. Let us denote a and ~ as the values of
technologies A and B, respectively, revealed after experimentation. In period 2, each user
has the option of adhering to the technology he used'in the first period or changing his
allegiance to the other technology. Accounting for the switching cost, I can write the
payoff matrix for the second period game as in Figure l.
~Insert Figure 1 about here~
There are four ~issible outcomes: (NS, NS), (NS, S), (S, NS), (S, S). The first
and second components correspond to the strategies for user 1 and user 2, respectively,
where S stands for the switch to the other technology and NS represents the strategy of
holdíng onto the technology used in the first period. We have the following proposition10
regarding the equilibrium in the second period when users agree to experiment in the first
period. ts
1'ropositinn 1. In the Ex Post Standardization game,
(i) If ~(3 - a ~ ~ s A, (NS, NS) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
(ii) If (i a~ ~s 0~, (S, NS) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
(iii) If a(3 ~ ~s - 0~, (NS, S) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
(iv) If ~(i - a ~ ~ 0- s, there exist multipie equilibria. (S, NS) and (NS,S) are both
equilibria and there is also a mixed strategy equilibrium. If the mixed strategy equilibrium
t 0-s
is played, player 1 plays switching with probability of pt-(a -~é - ~ and player 2
la s with (~ a)}(A s) . Both la ers et the same ex ted offs of P Y N2 - 20 P Y g P~ PaY
(at~)t(0-s)
2
Now analyze the socially optimal outcome in the second period given the values of
a and (~. lf neither of them switches, the social value is given by a t~. If there is
standardization on technology A or B, the value is given by 2(a t A) - s and 2(S t 0) - s,
respectively. Therefore, we have the following socially optimal rule for (ex post )
standardization.
1'roposition 2.
(i) (NS, NS) is socially optima] if and only if ~~- a ~ S s- 2 A.
(ii) (S, NS) is socially optimal if and only if ~- a? s- 2 A and ~~ a.
15Wc do not allow side-payments in the ex post standardization game. Gabel (1991)
claims that "in practice side payments feature much more commonly in ewnomic journals
than in industry." He attributes the efforts of the OSF (the Open Software Foundation) to
settleon a competitively neutral standard to the infeasibility of a side-payment scheme for a
non neuval one.11
(iii) (NS, S) is socially optimal if and only if a-~? s- 2 0 and a~(~.
Comparing the Nash equilibrium outcome with the socially optimal one, 1 can
identify two kinds of inefficiencies according to the sign of ~- s, as shown in Figure 2.
~ lnsert Figure 2 about here~
In the horizontally hatched area, the socially optimal outcome recommends
standardization by having the user of the inferior technology switch to the other user's
technology. However, in the equilíbrium outcome no switching occurs. Therefore, there
is too little cx ~~sr standardization in the market economy. 'lhereason is related to the
familiar positive extemality argument. When one party switches to the other technology to
ensure compatibility, he confers positive network externality to the other party. "Ihis effect
is ignored in the private decision problem. In the dotted area, the socially optimal outcome
is once again standardization on the better technology. However, they may end up
standardizing on the wrong technology if the user of the inferior technology insists on his
technology as the standard. In the mixed strategy equilibrium, there may be an additional
coordination failure resulting in the expost nonstandardization: neither may switch or both
may switch. ~6 As will be shown below, the consequences of these inefficiencies result in
two parties deciding on early standardization too frequently.
Given the equilibrium outcome ofthe second period, we can derive the expected
value of experimentation summed over two periods. Let S], -{(a, ~) ;(a, ~) E RZ}} be
the set of the possible values of the technologies revealed after use in period 1. Define the
following subsets of f2:
La-{(a. a);a-P'Is-AI}
C~-i(a, a);p-a~ls-Dli
16As one referee pointed out, if we introduce explicit dynamics in the e.rpost
standardization process, the game will exhibit the payoff structure of a"chicken game."
Then, there may be another type of inefficiency arising from delay in standardization. The
expected payoffs from playing this "chicken game", however, will be similar to the ones
from using mixed strategtes m the static game. As a result, there will be no change in any
conclusions drawn in the paper.12
~f-{(a. (~):a-~~Is-20~ti
E~y - {(u. (3) ; {3 - u ~ ~s - 20~t}, where ) x)~ - max (x, 0).
F.a (Ely ) is the set of parameters in which the unique equilibrium is standardizing on
t~hnology A(B) after experimentation, whereas FT, (Ep ) is the set of parameters in which
thc socially optimal outcomc is standardizing on A(B). Notc that Ea~ E., , and Ep S
E1i, which implies that there is toa little standardization ex post compared W the scx:ial
optimum. Thc complcmcnt ofa sct E with respcct to thc spacc S2 will bc dcnotcd by Ec.
We consider two cases according to the relative magnitude of the parameter values
of 0 and s.
Case 1: A s s.
Ixt us denote the complement ofa set E with respect to the space f2 by Ec. Taking
the equilibrium behavior in the second period into account, we can write the expected value
ofexperimentation for individual I as foliows:
vE - m t I,
(a t A)dG(a,~) }J
(~t 0- s)dG(a,~)'1
adG(a.~)
s~ te~ t ~~`
where m-J
a dG(a, (i) -1 ~ dG(a, ~).
S1 f2
Since the values of the two technologies, a and p, are assumed to be symmetrically
distributed, the expected value of experimentation for user 2 will be the same. The
aggregate welfare from the equilibrium outcome, (mazket-induced welfare,W~, therefore
is 2VE.
In contrast, if the second-period standardization decision is made in the ex ~st
socially optimal way, the expected value ofexperimentation for each individual will be
given by13
VE - m . ~ f (a t ~)dG(a.R) aJ
(R } ~ - s)dG(a,R) 'J
adG(a,R)'~I (3)
JFu Fii (E. ~ Enl`
I
Thc aggrcgatc wclfarc is WE -2VE . Duc to thc incfficicncy ofthc market outcomc in thc
second period, the market induced social welfare is less than the level of social welfare
when the c-xpc~sr optimal rule is adopted in the second-period decision. The inefficiency
loss in the c-x~C~st standardization game is given by
L-VE-Vg-1
OdG(a,~)tJ (RtO-s-a)dG(a,R)~0 (4)
~ -E„ ~ -~
sincc Ea ~ E„ and (p t 0- s- a) ? 0 on (E~j - Ed.
Casell:~~s.
In this case, the value of experimentation depends on the assumption we make on
equilibrium selection for the region ofthe multiple equilibria. For instance, ifwe assume
that they use mixed strategies, in view of proposition l, we can write the expected value of
experimentation as
VE- mt b I(a t 0)dG(a,R) tJ (Rt 0- s)dG(a,R) t I (a}R2 0
s)dG(a.R)
~ JF" E1i J(~. ' E41`
The expected value of experimentation under the first outcome is once again given by
equation (3). However, with 0~ s, the third term in the square bracket in (3) is zero;
since switching by neither player can never be optimum when the value of network benefit
is largcr than thc cost of unilatcral switching, (Ft, t Efl )`' is an cmpty evcnt .
In contcast, ifwe assume that they can coordinate on the pure strategy equilibrium
that sclccts thc supcrior tcchnology, thcn thcrc will bc no incfficicncy and V~ -VE and W~
-WE .14
2.2. F~r Anrc- Srundurdizution
Now suppose that the two parties agree to standardize on one of the two
technologies, say A, without loss ofgenerality. With assumption (1), we can write the
expected value of standardization as
Vs -(1 t b) (m t 0) (5)
When there is early standardization, there is no decision to be made in the second period
and there is no conflict between social planner and equilibrium outcome. The social value
of standardization is Wg - 2VS - 2(1 t S) (m t ~).
2.3. F.x Antc S~utufurdirution v.i. F'rpcriment
When the potential users of the technologies decide which route to take for
standardization, they will compare Vg and Vg. However, for the social planner who
controls the c.x fmst standardization process, the criterion will be the comparison between
VE and VS. Duc to the inefficiencics in the market process ofex post standardization we
idcntificd in proposition 2, wc can havc situations whcrc V~ ~V5 ~ VE . In that casc, thc
fust best outcome dictates the adoption ofexperimentation, while the equilibrium chooses
cx unte standardization since participants foresee the market inefficiencies in the exp~nst
standardization process. Therefore, we have the following proposition.
I~oposition 3. There is too much ex unte standardization compared with the social
optimum.
Propositions 2 and 3 make it clear that a distinction must be made between two
types of standardization processes. When there is no standardized technology, especially
in the early stages ofa technological cycle or in a nascent industry, it should not be viewed
as a failure in the standardization process. [t can be a deliberate and consensus choice by
potentia] users. By the same token, if we see standardization of technology early on, it
should not be viewed as a success or the first-best outcome. The reason why early
standardization has been chosen may not be that it was the fvst-best option but that rnarket15
inefficiencics were predicted in the ex~~st standardization process; a standard was agreed
on too hastily for fear ofeach party getting entrenched too deeply in his experimental
tcchnology,
Our analysis alui calls fiir caution in the judgement on the e.r~~st standardization
Process. livcn though there is [oo little c~x~ust standardization, there are also cases where
nons4tndardization is c~x~xst optima] since two experimented technologies turned out to be
not so different in their values; switching costs do not justify the standardization. ~~ Qf
course, these circumstances are exactly the ones for which experimentation is of lesser
value. Consequently, a decision to experiment can be considered to be a mistake.
However, we should be careful not to be trapped in this kind ofex pnst judgement,
especially when we do specific industry case studies. The right criterion should be based
on information available at the time of decision making rather than information after
experimentation. In lhis regard, c~xanre standardization is immune to cri[icism when the
actual use of technologies is essential for evaluation; the values of nonexperimented
technologics will nevcr be known precisely.~g
The next step is the comparative statics inquiring what the properties ofVE and VS
are in ordcr to determine the relative merits of experimentation vis-a-vis ex ante
standardization. To facilitate the comparative statics analysis, in the remainder of the paper
we focus only on the inefficiencies identified in Case 1( ~~ s), The possible inefficiencies
in Case II( 4~ s) are ignored since we do not have a good theory for selecting an
equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria.19
~~In contrast, Farrell and Saloner (1988) analyze the case where the outcome of standardization is always superior to that ofnonstandardization.
~sThis may explain why standardization is usually associated with success, since there is no information available to conduct counterfactual inquiries.
~yHowever, we mayjustify ourapproach in the following way. Suppose that the participants can communicate before experimentation in the first period, about how to play the game in situations of multiple equilibria. Then, they will decide to adopt the socially optimal n,le. When an actual situation occurs in which the game can be played no player has an incentive to deviate. It should be noted that the first kind ofinefficiencies cannot be eliminated by the nonbinding ptior communications since it is not expnst incentive16
I,et !h - VE VS. Then,
fi - - A ~b 1
((~ - a - s) dG(a,~) -1
AdG(a,~) , (6)
FT ~E„ -~,i' i
The tirst term is an unambiguous loss of compatibility benefit in the first period due to
experimentation with incompatible technologies. ~e terms in the square bracket are the
potentíal benetit of experimentation in the future. Since the benefit of experimentation is
realized in the future, it is clear that ifthe future is heavily discounted, experimentation is
never worthwhile. The first term is increase in the payoff by switching to the other
technology when it tums out to be much superior (i.e., in the event of E~. The second
term is loss of compatibility benefit when the ex pnst standardization is not realized. The
failure occurs when the two values turn out to be similar (i.e., in the event of ~ EQf E~c).
Inspection ofequation (6) enables us to derive the following properties: The
option of experimentation is more attractive as the compatibility benefit (~) and the
switching cost (s) is lower. A necessary condition for there to be experimentation is that
the sign of the expression in the square bracket be positive. In that case, experimentation is
more valuable if the future is more important. I also expect experimentation to be a better
option if the values of the two technologies tend to be negatively correlated. 7iten, the
probability ofevent ~Eut E~~c accurring will be smaller and the first term in the square
bracket will get largec TT~is intuition is confvmed in the next section for the two point
distributions case.
I can also extend our analysis to allow for the first mover advantage in the adoption
of technologies. Suppose that there is a first mover advantage in the sense that if the same
technology is chosen but at different times by different users, then the early adopter
receives a higher payoffthan the late adopter. I can represent this strategic asymmetry by
compatible. We may also justify our approach by appealing to the notion that
standardiiation on the superior technology is more focal.17
assuming that the first movcr gets a higher proportion of compatibility benefits; Ihe first
mover gcts ( I tk) A and the second mover gets ( 1-k) A. Then, when there is
experimentation, each player has the same chance ofbeing leader as he has of being
follower. Thereforc, as long as the probability ofde facto standardization is the same as
before, the first mover advantage will have no effect on Vg . However, the chance of
reaching a standard is smaller due to the stra[egic advantageenjoyed by the first mover.
This formalizes the idea that standardization is harder to achieve if the standard is not
competitively neutral and relative positions of the users are asymmetrically affected ~Gabel
(199]) ~. As a result, the first-mover advantage will make ex urue standardization more
attractive.
3. Two Point Uistributions Examplc and Corrclatiun
To funher analyze the properties of~, I confine ourselves in this section to the two
point distributions for each technology. Suppose that each technology can have one oftwo
possible values, vy and vL. Let the unconditional probability of each event be equal for
both technologies, i.e., Pi(vy) - P~(vL) -112, where i-A, B. I allow for the realizations
of values for each technology to be correlated to investigate the effect ofcorrelation on the
incentive to experiment. Since the experiment is more valuable when the two technologies
tend to have different values, I expect that the more positively correlated the two
technologies are, the less incentive there will be to experiment. 1 will confirm our intuition
in the two point distribution example below.
There are four possible outcomes: (vy, vy), (vy, vL), (vL, vy), and (vL, vL). Let
p be the correlation coefficient between the two technologies A and B. The probabilities
for each event can be derived in the following way.
Let E3 - vy - m- m- v~. Then, Var (a) - Var ((3) - 6~, and Cov (a,~) - ~ P(vy,
vH)' P(vl. vL) - P(vH, vL) - P(vL. vH)16`, which implies that
P- I P(vH, vl{) t P(vL, vL) - P(vH, vL) - P(vl,, vH)I (~)18
1 also know that P(vl l, vl.{) t P(vL, vU t P(vH, v~ t P(vL, v}.J) -]. Use of
symmetry, i.e., P(v}{, vl{) - P(v~, vU and P(vl{, vU - P(v~, vl{), gives us the
probabilities foreach possibleoutcome:
It Ptvtt. v~t) - P(vt: vt )- 4p and P(vH, vt )- P(vt: vH) - l4p (g)
"I'he value ofexperimentation can be written as follows:
vE- 14p vH(1}s)}lqp vL(lts)tl4p)vH}b(vH}0)~}~4p(vLta(vHt~-s)I
-m(Itb)tb~l4p(vH-v~-s)} IZP~~ (9)
Once again 1 assume that s is sufficiently large to satisfy condition ( I).ZO Then, the
value of c~.r urun standardi7ation is as before:
uS - (mt~)( I tb) (10)
"fhe difference between the two approaches to standardization is :
'U- V~-VS-1-4-b IZp~) tS l~p(vH-v~-s) (II)
"Ihe terms in the square bracket are the loss from experimentation; they lose compatibility
benefit of.~ in the first period and lose again in the second period if the ex posr
standardiration fails which occurs with probability of IZP in the two point distribution
case. The last term is the potential benefit from experimentation. If the experimented
technology has a lower value of v~ and the other technology is revealed to have a higher
value, vH , there can be potential gain of (vH - v~ - s) which occurs with probability of 14p.
From equation (7), we can easily see tha[ the value ofexperimentation relative to ex
uruc standardization incm.,ases as the correlation ccefficient gets smaller and smaller,
confirming our intuition. We can also analyze the effect of inean preserving spread on ~.
Let 0- vH - m- m- v~. Then, the increase in 6 can be thought ofas a parameter
'~Since P(v ~ v P(vH' v~ - 1-P H l)- P(v~ - 2 , the assumption ofno standard reversal in the
second period can be written as lzp (vl.{ - vU ~ s.19
representing the mean preserving spread in the distribution ofeach [echnology ~Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970)~. Since the gap between vH and v~ increases with 0(vtt - vt -~81, d,
is an increasing timction ot0. Increases in the riskiness of technologies enhance the value
o( cxpcrimcnl:uiun.
4. Concluding Remarks
I have presented a simple model toanalyze the tradeoff between (ex ante )
standardization and experimentation. In the process I proposed a new taxonomy for the
standardization process: ex untc vs, ex~CZrt. In this paper, I look at the ini[ial stage of
incompatibility not as a coordination failure or the result of the vested interests ofthe parties
concerned, but as a concerted effort to experiment with diverse technologies to extract
information about the true values of the potential technologies. Experimentation, however,
creates divergent preferences for each party, which leads to cx~x~sT standardization being
realized less frequently than the social optimum. The consequence ofthis t~esult is that the
two parties will agree on early standardization too frequently ifthey foresee the inefficiency
in the c~xpnst standardization process.
Our model is very stylized and can be extended in several additional ways. First, I
assumed that there was no ongoing uncertainty about the values of technologies.
Moreover, one experiment was sufficient to resolve all uncertainty. If the values of the
technologies are revealed over time or experiments generste only garbled information about
the true values, then the experimentation process will be an optimal stopping problem: then,
another decision variable is whc~n to stop the experimentation process and standardize.
Second, the values of technologies can change over time especially ifthe values
depend on the availability of complementary goods or there is a learning effect. Moreover,
all potential technologies may not be ready for adoption at the same time. Then, users can20
lock themselves out ofa superior technology by the time it is available.~ ~ In this case, the
waiting option should also be explicitly analyzed. Similarly, users can be asymmetric in
terms of their arrival time. Then, the adoption decision should be modelled as a sequential
one ~see Choi (19946) ~.
'I'hird, to facilitate the analysis the two potential technologies were assumed to be
equal ly attractívc c~x unm. Ifthey are not symmetrically distributed, the matching process
between the users and the technologies may not be such a harmonious one ifthey choose to
experiment. For instance, 1 can imagine that there is a very risky technology with a low
mean. Since this technology may tum out to be extremely valuable, experimentation is
worthwhile collectively. However, no one wants to experiment with this technology
owing to its low expected value ~Choi (1993b)J.
Finally, [ assumed that cxante standardization setting entails no extra cost.
However, a standard setting dces entail cost. If there are many users who can potentially
use standards without paying for them, there may be a significant free rider problem in
creating standards [see Gabel (1991) ~. This externality can create a bias againstex ante
standardization in favor ofexperiment.
'-t David (1985) provides a fascinating account of this lock-in effect for QWERTY
typewriters.21
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